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COMMENTS
AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE:
A LEGAL DILEMMA
by Laura Leigh Brown
HE United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported the
fatal disease now known as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) for the first time in July of 1981.' Three years later the CDC
had reported approximately seven thousand cases. 2 By mid-1985 the number
of reported cases of AIDS escalated to approximately twelve thousand. 3
President Reagan has called AIDS "Public Enemy Number One," and the
CDC recently mailed informational brochures on AIDS to all American
residences. 4 The fear and panic associated with AIDS spread throughout the
country and eventually reached the workplace environment. 5 The AIDS-
related workplace issues are numerous and largely interdependent. 6 With
the abundance of legal issues arising in the workplace, the Surgeon General,
1. Hecht, AIDS Update, AIDS Progress Report, PLASMA QUARTERLY, Spring 1986, at 4.
2. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 681, 681 n.2 (1985).
3. Mass, Medical Answers About AIDS, in AMA MANAGEMENT BRIEFING, AIDS: THE
WORKPLACE ISSUES 55, 74 (1985) [hereinafter AIDS: The WORKPLACE ISSUES].
4. SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UN-
DERSTANDING AIDS (1988) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING AIDS]. In 1987 President Reagan
established the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic to
advise the nation on measures needed to confront AIDS. Dallas Morning News, Sept. 25,
1988, at 46A, col. 1. While the Commission requested adoption of a broad national standard
outlawing AIDS discrimination, President Reagan failed to seek enactment of a federal an-
tidiscrimination statute and chose instead to refer the matter to the Justice Department for
further evaluation. Id. It seems that the administration prefers shifting protection from AIDS
discrimination from the federal government to the states. Id. The Commission's proponents,
however, argue that the AIDS problem merits a strong national law. Id. at 47A, col.l.
5. Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. I1, 11 (1985).
As early as 1984 the National Law Journal reported that the majority of grievances received by
the New York based Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Inc. were employment-
related concerns. Nat'l L.J., July 9, 1984, at 1.
6. AIDS-related issues prevalent in the workplace include confidentiality arising from
employee and applicant testing; discrimination problems arising due to refusal to hire based on
positive results from an AIDS test; liability for transmission of AIDS; wrongful termination
arising due to a positive result from an AIDS test; invasion of privacy; libel and slander arising
if an employer reveals an AIDS-infected employee's condition to other workers; federal, state,
or local laws governing occupational safety and health; workers' compensation laws; civil
rights of employees; provisions of collective bargaining agreements; informed consent; em-
ployee right-to-know statutes; as well as a host of insurance issues. Summary: Recommenda-
tions for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
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in one of his reports on AIDS,7 advised employers to educate themselves as
well as their employees about AIDS in order to reduce the circulation of
misinformation.8 The Surgeon General's most recent report indicates that
AIDS cannot be transmitted by mere casual contact.9
When faced with the news of an employee with AIDS, the manner in
which an employer reacts may affect the employer's potential future liability.
Some employers respond with compassion and education. Other employers
respond without considering the legal issues involved by firing the employee,
and thereby possibly creating a disturbance in the workplace. Employers
across the nation, as well as those attorneys representing them, need accu-
rate and factual information concerning AIDS and the possible ramifications
of any employment-related actions they may take towards employees in-
fected with the AIDS virus.' 0
This Comment discusses various discrimination and privacy problems
that arise in the workplace when an employer discovers an applicant or cur-
rent employee with AIDS. The intent of the Comment is to help personnel
managers, business owners, health care professionals, attorneys, and stu-
dents alike to understand better the legal implications of AIDS-related issues
in the workplace. The Comment begins with a brief medical background of
AIDS, then discusses federal legislation, federal case law, Texas legislation
and case law, and concludes with a discussion of the issues related to em-
ployee and applicant testing. An awareness of the numerous issues associ-
ated with AIDS and the advance preparation of a method to confront these
issues can help employers decrease their risk of financial liability and help
the AIDS-infected employee cope with the reality of the disease.
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
The following summary of medical terminology and facts associated with
the AIDS virus is meant to serve as a brief orientation for an employer and
that employer's attorney, when the employer learns of an employee with
AIDS. I I AIDS, as defined by the CDC, is the final stage of a series of health
III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 681, 687 (1985) [hereinafter Recommendations].
7. SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, RE-
PORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 32 (1986).
8. Id. The Surgeon General also encouraged the timely implementation of an AIDS
educational "plan" in offices, factories, and other worksites. Id. see also Marcotte, AIDS-A
Dilemma for Employers, 74 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (1988) (businesses need to avoid discrimination
while addressing workers' fears).
9. UNDERSTANDING AIDS, supra note 4, at 3. This report indicates AIDS cannot be
transmitted from a mosquito bite, saliva, sweat, tears, urine, a bowel movement, clothes, a
telephone, a toilet seat, or even from a kiss. Id.
10. An excellent source for accurate and current information on AIDS and federal law
relating to AIDS is the San Francisco AIDS Foundation.
11. While available medical knowledge concerning AIDS constantly expands, the medical
community has established and frequently uses several key definitions and terms. For the best




complications resulting from a virus12 transmitted through the exchange of
body fluids, namely blood or semen. 13 AIDS attacks a person's immune
system, leaving the body defenseless against certain infections that a healthy
person typically can fight successfully.14
When the AIDs virus enters the blood stream, it eventually destroys T-
Lymphocyte cells that protect the body from infection and disease. 15 At this
point the body produces antibodies that an HIV test can detect. 16 Individu-
als exposed to the virus may not display symptoms for more than five
years. 17 Even though infected persons may not manifest any physical symp-
toms of the illness, they are able to infect others.18
The symptoms associated with AIDS depend on the nature and extent of
the person's infection. Some common symptoms include: severe fatigue,
sometimes accompanied by headaches or dizziness; recurring fevers or night
sweats; weight loss; lymphadenopathy (enlarged and/or hardened lymph
glands); thrush (a white coating on the tongue or in the throat, which may
cause pain); persistent diarrhea; unexplained bleeding or bruising; persistent
neurologic or psychiatric symptoms; and a frequently recurring dry cough
caused by neither smoking nor the flu. 19 A less severe condition than AIDS,
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC) may be present when an individual shows
signs of illness that could also be attributed to other diseases. 20 A more
12. The virus is known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Human T-Cell
Lymphotrophic Virus-Type III (HTLV-III), Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus (LAV), or
AIDS-Related Virus (ARV) and hereinafter referred to as the "AIDS virus." Leonard, The
Legal Issues, in AIDS: The Workplace Issues 28, 29 (1986); SURGEON GENERAL, supra note
7, at 10.
13. Leonard, supra note 12, at 29. The most common methods of transmitting AIDS are
through intravenous drug use, blood transfusions, sexual intercourse with an infected partner,
and prenatal or natal exposure. Hecht, supra note 1, at 4. Insignificant amounts of the AIDS
virus were found in breast milk, urine, tears, sweat, and saliva. No reported cases of transmis-
sion from these fluids exists, nor does any evidence of transmission through mere casual con-
tact exist. Recommendations, supra note 6, at 682.
14. Mass, supra note 3, at 56.
15. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 7, at 10.
16. Id. Public use of this test to diagnose AIDS received unfavorable criticism for the
following reasons: (1) the test identifies the presence of antibodies, but does not indicate the
presence of the virus itself; (2) false positive or false negative readings may result; and (3)
numerous questions abound concerning the ethics and confidentiality of testing. Mass, supra
note 3, at 57-58.
17. Hecht, supra note 1, at 4. The incubation period, which varies among individuals, can
be as short as several months. On the opposite end of the spectrum, an individual exposed to
the virus may remain a lifetime carrier without ever developing AIDS. Id. But see infra note
148 for a recently developed contrary opinion indicating that 100% of those infected will
develop AIDS.
18. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 7, at 11.
19. Mass, supra note 3, at 64-65.
20. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 7, at 11. While AIDS is now classified according to
the stage of infection, "HIV infection" itself is increasingly viewed as the disease, with "AIDS
[a]s just one, late manifestation of that process." Redfield & Burke, HIV Infection: The
Clinical Picture, 259 SCIENTIFIC AMER. 90 (Oct. 1988). See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (June 24, 1988) (rec-
ommending that "HIV infection" replace the three-stage nomenclature of "HIV-positive,"
"ARC," and "AIDS"). A progressive classification system for HIV infection apparently con-




serious case occurs when the disease completely destroys the immune sys-
tem, leaving the body susceptible to certain "opportunistic diseases."'2 1 The
worst stage of the disease, "frank AIDS," "full-blown AIDS," or "CDC-
defined AIDS," is the period of time when the body is most susceptible to
rare cancers and infections. 22
The medical community has designated certain groups of individuals as
more likely to acquire the AIDS virus than others. Those designated "high
risk" groups include: males or females who are or have been sexually active
with various homosexual or bisexual males; intravenous drug users; those
persons with hemophilia; and others who receive large quantities of blood by
transfusion. 23 In general, monogamous male homosexuals with no prior his-
tory of sexual activity with other partners are less likely to acquire AIDS
than sexually active female heterosexuals with bisexual male partners.
24
On November 15, 1985, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services published guidelines on AIDS in the workplace.25 This
publication served to help employers prevent the transmission of AIDS in
the workplace. The guidelines focused on health care workers, personal ser-
vice workers, and food service workers. 26 With regard to those working in
offices, schools, factories, and construction sites, the guidelines indicated no
known risk of AIDS virus transmission.27 In an accompanying statement,
28
Dr. James 0. Mason stressed that the guidelines represent the Public Health
Service's continuing and unchanged attitude that AIDS is a sexually trans-
mitted disease, acquired through transmission of blood or semen, not by
daily physical contact.29
The Public Health Service's guidelines assist employers in educating
themselves as well as their subordinates on the current medical knowledge
about AIDS transmission. An overreaction by an employer who discovers
21. Opportunistic diseases are those infections that would not ordinarily cause disease if
the individual's resistance to disease was not fatally lowered. Sicklick & Rubinstein, A Medical
Review of Aids, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 5 (1985). Two of the most common opportunistic
diseases are Kaposi's Sarcoma, a rare type of skin cancer, and Pneumocisti carinii pneumonia,
a parasitic infection of the lungs. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 7, at 10.
22. G. Portela, AIDS: A Resource Manual for Texas Employers 4 (1986) (on file with the
Southwestern Law Journal).
23. Id. at 6. Haitians, previously classified by the CDC as a high-risk group, are now
included among the "other unknown" group of individuals with AIDS. Specifically, Haitians
do not make up a separate high-risk group because both heterosexual contact and use of con-
taminated needles contribute to AIDS transmission among Haitians. No evidence of a specific
mode of transmission exists among this group. Mass, supra note 3, at 59.
24. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 7.
25. Recommendations, supra note 6, at 681.
26. Id.
27. Statement by James 0. Mason, M.D., Dr. P.H., Acting Assistant Secretary for
Health, U.S. Public Health Service, Nov. 14, 1985 [hereinafter Statement], reprinted in G.
Portela, supra note 22, at 65. Dr. Mason stressed that employers should not prevent employ-
ees known to be infected in these types of employment settings from working, using tele-
phones, office equipment, toilets, showers, eating facilities, and water fountains. Statement,
supra, at 7.
28. Statement, supra note 27, at 1.
29. Id. at 3, 8. For parallel judicial authority, see LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d
697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
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that an employee has tested positive for AIDS could be very detrimental to
the employer. Employers should be aware that an individual who tests posi-
tive for the presence of antibodies but who does not reveal any AIDS symp-
toms, does not have and may never develop CDC-defined AIDS.30
Similarly, an individual revealing AIDS-related symptoms does not neces-
sarily have AIDS, and may never develop CDC-defined AIDS.31 Even a
person who has AIDS may contain such an insignificant amount of the virus
as to be unable to transmit the disease.32
An employer must take notice of the consequences of employee dismissal,
segregation, or suspension when the employer merely perceives AIDS infec-
tion or the possibility of future acquisition of AIDS in an employee. 33 Simi-
larly the duty of the employer's attorney to keep abreast of the current state
of the law concerning AIDS in the workplace also plays an important role.
Given the uncertainty in the law in this area, the employer will rely upon an
attorney to provide careful and thoroughly investigated legal advice until the
courts or legislature firmly establish relevant legal precedent.
II. THE LAW
A. Federal Legislation
When faced with the dilemma of how to handle a case of AIDS in the
workplace,34 the employer's attorney should give adequate attention to ex-
isting substantive laws. 35 While no federal statute strictly prohibits termina-
tion of an employee with AIDS, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973
30. Leonard, supra note 12, at 30. But see infra note 148 for an opposing view.
31. Leonard, supra note 12, at 30.
32. Id. This is the typical setting that makes AIDS such a controversial issue in the work-
place. An employee may harbor an HIV infection while being virtually asymptomatic, or
experience minor symptoms that do not physically prevent him or her from working. Leo-
nard, supra note 5, at 19.
33. Primary factors an employer should consider when making an AIDS-related employ-
ment/termination decision are the employee's level of infection and physical ability to continue
working. Madoff, AIDS-Related Employment Discrimination Issues in the Workplace, in
AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF A MEDICAL CRISIS 128, 132 (1986) (on file with the Southwestern
Law Journal).
34. Various methods that employers use when dealing with AIDS in the workplace in-
clude: testing applicants as well as employees for the AIDS virus; implementing an AIDS
educational program on the work site; permitting those employees who tested positive for
AIDS to continue working until physically unable; offering the employee with AIDS monetary
relief and benefits in exchange for an agreement to take a permanent leave of absence; and
outright dismissal upon positive identification of the AIDS virus. Wall St. J., Oct 18, 1985, at
12, col. 2. A Dallas law firm identifies three approaches employers might take as (1) the
"education/sympathy" approach; (2) negotiated indefinite leaves of absence or other settle-
ment; and (3) extensive use of AIDS testing for applicants and/or current employees. R.
Gaswirth & D. Fenton, What Employers Are Doing About AIDS 1 (1987) (on file with the
Southwestern Law Journal).
35. Employers may be subject to a state's workers' compensation law as well as federal
regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984, Supp. III 1985, Supp. IV 1986), and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983, Supp. 11 1984, Supp. III 1985,
Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of the impact of these laws, see Zellner, Employer's Di-
lemma: The AIDS Crisis, FOR THE DEFENSE, May 1988, at 7-9. The Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA) makes it clear that discharged employees with
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
(the Rehabilitation Act)3 6 may serve as a guide. The Rehabilitation Act cov-
ers only those employers who are federal contractors, subcontractors, or
those who receive other federal financial assistance.37 The key question is
whether a covered employee whose AIDS test produced positive results is
"handicapped" within the meaning of the statute and therefore entitled to its
protection. 38
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal contractors, subcontractors, and
recipients of federal funds from discriminating against certain handicapped
individuals in the employment relationship. 39 The Rehabilitation Act de-
fines a handicapped individual as any physically or mentally impaired indi-
vidual whose primary life activities are substantially limited due to the
impairment; who has a documented history of such impairment;4 or whom
others perceive as impaired.41 To receive protection under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, a handicapped employee must also meet the "otherwise qualified"
standard.4 2 An otherwise qualified handicapped person is someone who, de-
spite the handicap, can perform the essential tasks of a job.4 3 An employer
has a legal duty to reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee unless
such accommodation results in undue hardship.44
Attorneys representing employers who are confronted with AIDS in the
workplace have little express administrative or judicial guidance to assist
them in formulating and recommending a proper course of conduct for em-
AIDS are entitled to continued coverage by the employer's medical benefits plan for eighteen
months after the occurrence of a qualifying event. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (Supp. IV 1986).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (Supp. IV 1986).
37. Id.
38. See Shumaker, AIDS: Does it Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 572 (1986); Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination:
Should AIDS be Considered a Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1095 (1987).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (Supp. IV 1986).
40. The second and third phrases of the definition of "handicapped individual" extend
coverage under the Rehabilitation Act to those who are not presently disabled. Leonard, supra
note 2, at 691.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). The Department of Labor further defined key
terms that the Rehabilitation Act uses in its definition of a "handicapped individual." "Life
activities" include those normal, day-to-day physical activities that enable one to function in
society, such as sensory functions, movement, and thought. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.54 (1987).
"Substantially limits" is generally the severity of the impairment and the concomitant extent to
which the severity affects one's ability to work. Id. Factors to consider include potential diffi-
culty in obtaining, maintaining, or excelling in employment. Id. "Has a record of such im-
pairment" is a large category including those who may be completely recovered from a prior
impairment as well as those who were erroneously classified. Id. The drafters included this
phrase to guard against discriminatory attitudes of employers, supervisors, and co-workers.
Id. The phrase, "regarded as having such an impairment" is one step removed from the previ-
ous phrase. It refers to those who are perceived as handicapped, regardless of whether an
actual impairment exists. Id.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1986).
43. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 422 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("otherwise
qualified" individual with handicap may not be denied employment, terminated from job, or
treated in manner inconsistent with treatment of nonhandicapped individuals).
44. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1987). Relevant considerations regarding accommodation
include: size of employee program, type of operation, composition and structure, and nature
and cost of accommodation. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1986). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704
(1987) (reasonable accommodation); id. § 1613.702(f) (defining qualified handicapped person).
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ployers.45 Absent express and explicit guidance, attorneys can reasonably
rely upon a cautious course of action that will eliminate the potential for
employer liability. 46 If an employee tests positive for the AIDS virus, but is
physically able to perform the essential tasks of his or her job without expos-
ing anyone to actual and significant danger, then an employer must permit
the employee to work, despite the fact that the person may have a potentially
or actually disabling impairment. 47
Attorneys may also want to educate employers on the scope of the Reha-
bilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act clearly protects not only those actu-
ally disabled, but also those individuals perceived as disabled.48 For this
reason, employers who fall within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act must
assume that both categories of employees are handicapped and therefore en-
titled to protection under the Act.49
Some argue that AIDS is not a handicap within the meaning of the Reha-
bilitation Act.50 This notion emerges from the belief that the legislative his-
tory of the statute does not indicate that Congress intended to include
contagious diseases within the meaning of "physical impairment.151 This
argument is weak in two respects. First, the Rehabilitation Act specifically
excludes alcoholism and drug abuse from its coverage where current use of
such substances prevents an individual from performing his daily employ-
ment tasks or where an individual's employment is a threat to others due to
the use of such stimulants. 52 This indicates that if Congress did not intend
the Rehabilitation Act to cover contagious diseases, Congress would have
expressly excluded them along with the exemptions for alcoholism and drug
abuse. 53 In addition, the United States Supreme Court recently held that
tuberculosis, a contagious disease, is a handicap within the meaning of the
45. In the spring of 1988 Congress considered several legislative proposals such as H.R.
3071 and S. 1575, which contain four categories that the American Bar Association argues
should be part of a federal AIDS policy: voluntary testing, counseling, confidentiality, and
anti-discrimination. McMillion, Toward a Natiopfal Aids Policy, 74 A.B.A. J. 123 (July 1,
1988).
46. Leonard, supra note 12, at 32.
47. Id. In 1979 the United States Supreme Court presented this theme in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 422 U.S. 397 (1979), the Court's first case that interpreted the
Rehabilitation Act. Leonard, supra note 12, at 32.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. IV 1986). The significance of this extended coverage to
those not actually ill but nevertheless in the "risk groups" is immense. Numerous instances of
discrimination arise in the workplace based on unfounded fears of misinformed co-workers.
These employees are faced with a real threat of losing their jobs, just as are those who are
actually ill. Leonard, supra note 12, at 33. Such treatment should be considered equally as
discriminatory and thus prohibited as are those instances of discrimination concerning an indi-
vidual who actually has AIDS. Id. at 34.
49. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 11. In determining whether an employer has violated the
Rehabilitation Act, the employer's motive for firing the employee is as important as the em-
ployee's physical condition. Leonard, supra note 12, at 32.
50. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 11.
51. Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
53. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 11-12.
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
federal Rehabilitation Act.54 An analogy to the AIDS situation seems rea-
sonable and probable. Further, the chairman of the White House AIDS
Commission recently recommended strong federal antidiscrimination pro-
tection for individuals infected with the AIDS virus.
55
B. Federal Case Law-The Supreme Court
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline5 6 is the first Supreme
Court decision addressing the issue of handicap discrimination laws and
their applicability to contagious diseases. In Arline an elementary school
teacher filed suit in federal court alleging that the school board dismissed her
solely because of her susceptibility to recurrence of tuberculosis. Arline ini-
tially contracted tuberculosis at age fourteen. The disease went into remis-
sion for twenty years, during which time she became employed at the
elementary school. During 1977 and 1978 Arline suffered three relapses, the
third of which resulted in her dismissal from the school.
Arline argued that her illness qualified her as a "handicapped" person
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court held that
Arline was not "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act, and that, even
assuming she were, she was not "qualified" to teach elementary school. 57
The court of appeals reversed, 58 holding that those individuals with conta-
gious diseases are within the coverage of the Act.5 9
In affirming the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court found
that Arline had a recorded history of impairment due to hospitalization in
her youth for tuberculosis, a disease that substantially limited one or more of
her major life activities. 60 The Court did not consider whether an asymp-
tomatic carrier of a contagious disease, such as AIDS, could be considered
"physically impaired" within the meaning of the Act, or whether such a
person, based on contagiousness alone, could be considered "handicapped"
within the meaning of the Act.6' Furthermore, the Court rejected the argu-
54. School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132, 94 L. Ed. 2d
307, 322 (1987).
55. Dallas Morning News, June 3, 1988, at 4A, col. 1. This recommendation is contrary
to the Reagan administration's position that AIDS legislation should be enacted at state and
local levels. Id.
56. 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1987).
57. 772 F.2d 759, 761 (11th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 765.
59. Id. at 763-64.
60. 107 S. Ct. at 1124, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 308.
61. Id. at 1128 n.7, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 315 n.7. It is probable that the Supreme Court's
unanswered question in footnote 7 of the Arline decision will be the subject of much debate in
the legal community. The factual setting concerns whether an individual who is infected but
not otherwise physically impaired would be protected from discrimination due to fear of conta-
gion. Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAW 109, 112 (Yale AIDS Law
Project 1987). One author believes that Arline makes it clear that the Supreme Court would
consider these individuals as handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
113. Whether these individuals would be considered handicapped within the meaning of state
and local disability laws depends on the wording of the statute, the statute's legislative history,
and administrative and judicial interpretation of the statute. Id.
On March 2, 1988, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
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ment that fear of a disease's contagious effects on others is a legitimate
ground for termination.62
100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). This new piece of legislation contains an amendment purporting
to clarify questions that arise with handicapped individuals in the employment context. Id. at
31. The amendment itself amends the definition of "handicapped individual" found in section
706(8) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by adding the following text after paragraph (B):
(C) For the purpose of sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to employ-
ment, such term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious
disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would con-
stitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by
reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the
duties of the job.
Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
The implications of this amendment are not clear. One author believes this new legislation
will have "some impact on inclusion of AIDS as a 'handicap' under many anti-discrimination
statutes." Zellner, supra note 35, at 4. The import of the author's statement is not even clear.
Some scholars believe the amendment answers the Supreme Court's unanswered question in
footnote 7 of Arline. Interview with Tom Mayo, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity (Sept. 13, 1988). What would constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of
others would be a job-specific determination. An infected chef may impose a direct threat on
the health and safety of those consuming his dishes, whereas an infected bank teller most likely
would not impose such a direct threat on co-workers and customers.
Most importantly, the amendment does not refer to the employer's duty to provide reason-
able accommodation. Shall we imply a duty to reasonably accommodate infected employees?
Must the direct threat be unavoidable? By excluding infections and contagious conditions
from the definition of "handicap," the amendment could be read as negating the duty, imposed
by the substantive portion of § 504, to provide reasonable accommodation. The legislative
history of the amendment, however, supports a different reading. According to the Senate and
House floor managers, co-sponsors of the legislation, and even opponents of the legislation, the
amendment to § 504 was intended to codify the Arline decision, to extend the holding in Arline
to infected and contagious persons who are asymptomatic, and to clarify the duty of employers
to consider reasonable accommodation in determining whether an employee poses a "direct
threat" to others. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S256-57 (Jan. 28, 1988) (comments of Sen. Har-
kin & Sen. Humphrey); id. at S723 (Feb. 4, 1988) (comments of Sen. Cranston); id. at S772
(Feb. 16, 1988) (comments of Sen. Inouye); id. at S1738-40 (Mar. 2, 1988) (comments of Sen.
Kennedy, Sen. Weicker & Sen. Harkin); id. at S2403, 2416 (comments of Sen. Hatch); id. at
H566-68 (Mar. 2, 1988) (comments of Rep. Hawkins); id. at H583-84 (Mar. 2, 1988) (com-
ments of Rep. Edwards); id. at H1064-65 (comments of Rep. Hawkins; exchange of letters
between Sen. Harkin and Reps. Hawkins and Edwards). See generally C. Feldblum, Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1988 Coverage of Contagious Diseases Under Section 504 (1988)
(unpublished paper prepared by American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, AIDS and Civil
Liberties Project; copy on file with the Southwestern Law Journal).
At first blush some scholars may interpret this amendment as overruling Arline. By review-
ing the Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Restoration Act, one could argue that
this is not the proper interpretation. S. REP. No. 100-64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988). The
Senate report speaks of rejecting the Humphrey amendment, an amendment that would have
reversed the decision of Arline. Id. at 29. If the committee rejected such a version of the
amendment, then logically the approved version of the amendment must not reverse Arline. If
the amendment does not reverse Arline, then it must fill the gap left unanswered by the
Supreme Court in footnote 7. Arguably Congress would not have enacted an amendment that
merely repeated the holding of Arline.
The amendment also does not mandate that an infected or contagious individual display
physical manifestations of the disease. Does this indicate that a contagious individual with no
physical manifestations of the disease, who does not constitute a direct threat, or who is able to
perform the duties of the job will be considered handicapped? Will an infected person display-
ing no physical manifestations of the disease not be considered handicapped if that person does
not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others? There is no clear answer.
62. 107 S. Ct at 1129-30, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 319. The Court stated that the Act replaces
fearful reactions with well-reasoned and medically sound judgments when considering whether
a contagious handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" to continue working. Id. The
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While the particular facts of Arline limited the holding to the contagious
disease of tuberculosis, the Court's reasoning can apply reasonably and per-
suasively to AIDS cases. If federal and state courts63 follow the reasoning of
Arline, finding that AIDS and related conditions are "handicaps" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, the likely effect will be protection from
discrimination for those AIDS victims who are otherwise qualified to con-
tinue their employment.
Despite Arline's interpretation as support for AIDS victims, two differ-
ences exist that may deter a federal court from following such a line of rea-
soning. First, tuberculosis is a disease the medical community has known
for a relatively long period of time and it has firmly established sources of
transmission.64 The medical data concerning AIDS, on the other hand, is
constantly undergoing changes as society becomes better educated in the
causes of AIDS and the sources of AIDS transmission. 65 Second, since
AIDS was not a known disease at the time the Rehabilitation Act drafters
considered the Act's range of coverage, Congress at least arguably did not
intend to extend the Act's coverage to a disease that did not then exist. 66
C. Other Federal Cases
In December 1986, a federal district judge in California held in Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified School District67 that AIDS is a handicap within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.68 Ryan Thomas, a child with AIDS, bit a
fellow classmate, with the result that the school voted to bar Thomas from
attending class. The judge found that the law required the school to reason-
ably accommodate the child and also found Thomas qualified to attend
class. 69 The judge granted Thomas's motion for preliminary injunction, or-
dering the school to readmit the child based on his classification as a handi-
capped individual entitled to protection from discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act.70
Another federal case, Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget &
test of whether a contagious handicapped person is "otherwise qualified," consists of a reason-
able medical judgment based on the nature, duration, and severity of the risk, the probability
of transmission with resulting harm, and whether, based on these medical findings, the em-
ployer is able to reasonably accommodate the employee. Id. at 1130-32, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 320-
22.
63. Some states modeled their discrimination statute after the federal Rehabilitation Act,
thereby enabling those states to follow the reasoning of courts interpreting the federal statute.
G. Portela, supra note 22, at 17. See Leonard, supra note 2, at 691 n.39 (list of thirteen juris-
dictions that have employment discrimination statutes similar to federal Rehabilitation Act).
64. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 14.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
68. Id. at 381.
69. Id. at 381-82.
70. Id. at 383. One significant aspect of this case is that the court placed the burden upon
the school to prove danger of transmission, and not upon the child to show that no danger
existed. See Handicap Discrimination, Federal Judge Terms AIDS a Handicap Under Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act, I AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 22, at 1, 2 (Nov. 19, 1986).
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Management Policy,71 presented the first time that an employee terminated
for having AIDS filed suit in the United States. 72 Broward County, Florida,
fired Shuttleworth from his position as a budget analyst three months after a
positive AIDS diagnosis. The Florida Commission on Human Relations
had previously ruled in December 1985 that AIDS is a protected handicap
in the employment setting. 73  After the administrative decision, Shut-
tleworth filed suit in federal court, alleging violation of his rights to due
process and equal protection under both the federal 74 and state75 constitu-
tions, as well as the federal disability discrimination statute.76 The parties
settled out of court, the County agreeing to reinstate Shuttleworth and pay
him $196,000, which included back pay, medical bills, attorney fees, and
insurance reinstatement. 77
Part of the difficulty concerning the definition of handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act stems from the conflicting opinions of the Department of
Justice and the American Medical Association (AMA). In June of 1986 the
Department of Justice issued an opinion on section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act,78 stating that employment discrimination based on fear of contagion,
whether real or perceived, is permissible discrimination that the Act does
not prohibit. 79 Medical and legal authorities question the Department's
opinion,80 and the Supreme Court rejected this view in the Arline 8 decision.
71. 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
72. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 15.
73. Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget & Mgt. Pol., FCHR No. 85-0624,
Dec. 11, 1985.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1968, amended 1974).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1986).
77. Handicap Discrimination, Settlement Reached in Landmark Bias Suit, 1 AIDS Pol'y
& L. (BNA) No. 24, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1986). Abby Rubenfeld, managing attorney for Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, characterized the settlement as important precedent ex-
pressing public opinion. Rubenfeld typified the settlement as an admission by the county that
they were wrong. Id. at 2.
78. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988)). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was
the section covering employers who receive federal financial assistance. Id.
79. Opinion Memorandum, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (June 20, 1986),
55 U.S.L.W. 2009-10 (July 1, 1986). The Justice Department's underlying rationale is that the
ability to transmit a disease (contagion) is not a handicap; therefore, an employment decision
based on fear of transmission does not violate the statute. Id.
80. Michael Berne, a health law attorney with the New York firm of Baer, Marks, and
Upham predicted rejection of the Department's opinion based on his belief that the opinion
was drafted merely as a means to serve a political end. Lawyers, Legislators See Justice Depart-
ment Setback, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 4, at 4 (Mar. 11, 1987). The Consortium for
Citizens with Developmental Disabilities, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and
Reps. Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) and Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.) sent a letter to Attorney General
Edwin Meese requesting withdrawal of the Department's opinion. The letter argued that if the
Department's reasoning were accepted, it would create a major loophole in employment dis-
crimination law, allowing the precise fear and irrationality the Rehabilitation Act intended to
redress. Discrimination, Justice Urged to Rescind Opinion, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 15,
at 5 (Aug. 13, 1986). In addition, on Mar. 4, 1987, Rep. William Dannemeyer (R-Cal.) intro-
duced H.R. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) as an attempt to adopt legislation to override
the Arline decision by excluding individuals with contagious diseases from the definition of
handicapped individuals found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Lawyers, Legislators See
Justice Department Setback, supra, at 4. The American Bar Association requested that Assis-
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The AMA in its amicus curiae brief in the Arline case argued that the
Department of Justice's opinion was incorrect as a matter of law.82 The
AMA argued that the Department of Justice's treatment of contagious dis-
eases, distinguishing between the effect of the impairment on the individual
and the effect on third parties, is erroneous. 83 The AMA proffered that it is
the impairment itself that constitutes the handicap, 84 not merely its effects
upon the individual. 85
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, Chalk v. United States District Court Cen-
tral District of California,86 the United States Court of Appeals stated that
AIDS may qualify as a handicap under the federal Rehabilitation Act.87
Chalk worked for the county as a teacher. Subsequent to his AIDS diagno-
sis, his doctors consented to his return to the classroom. The county vetoed
Chalk's return to the classroom and transferred him to an administrative
position. Chalk sued the county based upon a violation of the federal Reha-
bilitation Act and requested injunctions against his exclusion from the class-
room. The Ninth Circuit granted Chalk's preliminary injunction and
approved his return to the classroom. 88
D. State Legislation in Texas
Generally, the basis of most state statutes protecting employees suffering
from AIDS are laws prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped or
the disabled. Careful attention to the definition and interpretation of "hand-
icapped" within each statute is necessary to ensure that AIDS falls within
the definition. 89 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes that forbid discrimination by employers in the private sector due to
handicap. 90 In some states, the definition is modeled after that found in the
federal Rehabilitation Act.91 In addition to those states with general laws
protecting the handicapped, California, Florida, Wisconsin, and most re-
cently Texas, have enacted specific laws containing various prohibitions on
tant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
issue a revised memorandum clarifying the proper interpretation of § 504 of the Act as es-
poused by the Supreme Court in Arline. McMillion, supra note 45, at 123.
81. 107 S. Ct. at 1123, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 307.
82. Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 11-12, Arline v. School Board, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 85-1277).
83. Id. at 24-25.
84. The AMA defines handicap as "an impairment that causes certain limiting effects on
life activities." Id. at 24.
85. Id.
86. 840 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. For example, Kentucky's discrimination statute specifically excludes coverage for per-
sons afflicted with communicable diseases, thereby appearing to exclude AIDS as well. Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
90. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 17; see also Leonard, supra note 5, at 21 n.52 (discussing
new legislation restricting employment discrimination on the basis of physical handicap or
disability).
91. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 17; see Leonard, supra note 2, at 691 n.39 (list of thirteen
jurisdictions that modeled their discrimination statutes after the federal Rehabilitation Act).
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the uses of blood tests for AIDS.92 Local ordinances enacted in a particular
city may also serve as a guide.93
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) 94 prohibits dis-
crimination in employment based on race, color, handicap, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or age.95 Section 2.01(7)(A) defines "handicapped person" as
one who is mentally or physically handicapped, which includes mental retar-
dation, hearing problems, speech problems, visual impairment, being crip-
pled, and any other health problem requiring special ambulatory devices or
services.96 In addition, section 2.01(7)(A) contains specific exclusions from
coverage for persons addicted to drugs or alcohol. 97 Section 2.01(7)(B) pro-
vides a similar definition for "handicap. 98
The attorney general of Texas recently issued an opinion clarifying the
handicap standing requirements for filing an employment discrimination
complaint under article 5221k of the TCHRA. 99 The opinion stated that the
commission's interpretation of a handicap, as expressed in section 2.01(7),
was not limited to categories listed within the statute.1°° The attorney gen-
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.606
(West 1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, §§ 9.01-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1987).
93. On Dec. 21, 1986, Austin, Texas, became the first city outside of California to ban
AIDS-based discrimination. The Austin City Council approved a broad ordinance prohibiting
employers with at least sixteen employees, employment agencies, and labor unions from dis-
criminating against employees with AIDS-related complex, employees who tested positive but
do not have the disease, and those merely perceived as having AIDS or presenting a substantial
risk of contracting the disease. Discrimination, Broad Anti-Bias Ordinance Approved by Austin
Council, AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 25, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1986). Los Angeles, San Francisco,
West Hollywood, and Hayward, California, all passed similar ordinances prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment, housing, and public accommodations. Id. For a brief discussion of
three California ordinances, see G. Portela, supra note 22, at 19-20.
94. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1988).
95. See id. § 5.01(1).
96. See id. § 2.01(7)(A). Section 1.04(b) provides a specific rule of construction, stating
that the phrases "because of handicap" or "on the basis of handicap" refer to discrimination
because of a health condition that does not impede that person's ability to perform the essential
tasks of the job in question. See id. § 1.04(b). This rule of construction is very similar to the
"otherwise qualified" requirement found in the federal Rehabilitation Act. Elstner v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
97. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(7)(A) (Vernon 1987).
98. See id. § 2.01(7)(B). This section defines handicap as "a condition either mental or
physical that includes mental retardation, hardness of hearing, deafness, speech impairment,
visual handicap, being crippled, or any other health impairment that requires special ambula-
tory devices or services, as defined in Section 121.002(4), Human Resources Code ...... Id.
(emphasis added). This section expressly excludes drug and alcohol addiction from coverage.
Id.
99. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987). A person seeking relief under the TCHRA
may seek administrative review of the claim by filing a complaint with the commission. TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1987). If the commission determines
that a reasonable basis exists for believing the employer has unlawfully discriminated against
the claimant, and if the administrative procedures proved unsuccessful, the commission may
then seek judicial action on behalf of the claimant, permitting the claimant to intervene in such
civil action. See id. § 7.01(a).
100. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987). The commission defines "mental or physical
handicapping condition" as "a permanent condition which may or may not be controlled by
medication or a corrective device and which may or may not impair a person's ability to
perform a particular job." Id.
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eral placed persons with chronic illnesses and diseases within the necessary
standing requirements of the TCHRA.101
The attorney general's analysis began by emphasizing the legislative in-
tent. ' 0 2 Based on an analysis of the commission's use of the words "includ-
ing" and "include" in the statute, the attorney general determined that the
usual meaning of these words implies an incomplete enumeration.103 The
attorney general's opinion then examined the specific exceptions of persons
addicted to drugs, controlled substances, and alcohol from the definitions of
"handicapped person" and "handicap."104 The attorney general relied on
State v. Richards,0 5 in which the Texas Supreme Court characterized the
use of specific exclusions as a common rule of statutory construction
whereby the legislative intent is to include all other conditions not specifi-
cally excluded.'0 6 The opinion considered the interpretation of the statute
by the agency charged with its administration10 7 and concluded that the
agency had properly interpreted the definitions contained in section 2.01(7)
as merely a partial list of conditions that the TCHRA covers. 08
The attorney general's opinion then focused on whether employer dis-
crimination based on a perception that the employee is handicapped is ac-
tionable under the TCHRA. 10 9 The opinion determined that the TCHRA
encompassed the commission's interpretation, which allowed a cause of ac-
tion based on a perception that the claimant is handicapped, whether or not
the person is in fact handicapped.1 0 The attorney general pointed out that
prior to September of 1983, section 121.003(f) of the Human Resources
Code"' employed the term "handicapped person" in prohibiting such dis-
crimination by an employer. 1 2 The TCHRA replaced section 121.003(f),
prohibiting such discrimination against "an individual."' '3 The attorney
general gave great weight to the plain language of the TCHRA, granting
standing to those employees discriminated against on the basis of an em-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The opinion discussed Republic Ins. Co. v. Silverton Elevators, Inc., 493 S.W.2d
748, 752 (Tex. 1973), and Peerless Carbon Black Co. v. Sheppard, 113 S.W.2d 996, 997 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1938, writ ref'd), to support the well-settled rule that the words "include"
and "including" are generally used as terms of enlargement rather than of restriction. Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
104. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
105. 301 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1957).
106. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
107. Id. The opinion relied upon Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Armco Steel Corp. v. Texas Employment Comm'n,
386 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-
648 (1987).
108. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Human Resources Code, ch. 352, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 939, repealed by Act of
1983, ch. 7, § 10.03(c), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 57 (prior to Sept. 1983, § 121.003(f) of Human
Resources Code).
112. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
113. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-.03 (Vernon 1987)).
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ployer-perceived handicap, whether or not the employee is handicapped.' 14
The attorney general's opinion then referred to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. A rline,115 which held that
the federal Rehabilitation Act does not exclude a person with tuberculosis, a
contagious disease, merely because contagion constituted one of the symp-
toms of the impairment.1 16 The Supreme Court opinion added that discrim-
ination against employees who are not "otherwise qualified" to continue
working because of an unreasonable risk of contagion based upon the sound
medical judgment of a public health official, may constitute permissible dis-
crimination not violative of the federal statute.' 17 Based on the above opin-
ion, the attorney general assumed the same line of reasoning would apply
when considering the state discrimination statute. 118
Though not explicitly providing coverage for persons with AIDS, the
TCHRA seems to afford protection against discrimination for those individ-
uals afflicted with the disease as long as they are physically able to meet the
requirements of their job. Likewise, if an employer perceives those individu-
als as having AIDS when in fact they do not, the statute also arguably pro-
tects them. The position of the Texas Commission on Human Rights
strengthens this position, as does the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in Arline.' 19
E. Texas Case Law
A recent Texas case dealing with the issue of AIDS in the workplace pro-
vides further guidance. In Little v. Bryce 120 discharged butcher Steven Little
brought an action for slander against a co-worker, and an action for wrong-
ful termination against his employer based on his employer's false perception
that Little had AIDS. Little apparently told Bryce, a co-worker at a grocery
store, that one of his roommates underwent an AIDS test. Little alleged that
114. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648, at 2946 (1987). The attorney general relied on
Carter v. Gulf Oil Corp., 699 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ), which
determined that in order to grant standing, the former statute required a determination of
whether the claimant was a "handicapped person," while the TCHRA requires only a determi-
nation of whether an employer did not hire the individual "because of handicap." Op. Tex.
Att'y Gen. No. JM-648, supra, at 2945-46. The attorney general also focused on Lunsford v.
City of Bryan, 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1957), where the court stated that the employer's
subjective reason for discriminating against the employee, not the precise status of the em-
ployee, is the controlling factor. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen., supra, at 2946.
115. 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307, 316 (1987). For a discussion of Arline, see
supra notes 56-66 & accompanying text.
116. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987) (discussing Arline).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Determining that AIDS is a handicap within the meaning of the statute does not
conclusively solve a potential claimant's problems, or allow the claimant immediate relief.
Most state and federal employment discrimination statutes contain provisions that exclude
coverage for the handicapped individual if (1) the person is not physically able to meet the job
requirements, (2) the person's presence at work is a threat to his or her own health and safety,
as well as to co-workers, or (3) the employer is unable to reasonably accommodate the handi-
capped person without facing an undue burden. Leonard, supra note 5, at 25-26.
120. 733 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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Bryce told other co-workers and supervisors that it was possible Little had
contracted AIDS and had been exposed to the virus by his roommate.
When the supervisor called Little to his office he presented Little with two
alternatives-voluntarily resign, or face termination due to health reasons.
Little, denying he had AIDS, chose the latter, and subsequently sought
$30,000 in actual damages and $300,000 in punitive damages for Bryce's
slanderous statements. Little alleged wrongful termination in violation of
the public policy of the state, as expressed in the TCHRA, claiming he was a
handicapped person within the meaning of the statute.
The Houston court of appeals ruled that the district court erred in grant-
ing a summary judgment to the employer, and remanded the case for a trial
on the merits. 12 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Sam Bass considered only
the procedural matters of the case, stating that the function of an intermedi-
ate appellate court is to discuss only those matters that are necessary to and
dispositive of the appeal. 122 In a concurring opinion, Justice Levy employed
a somewhat different approach, considering the merits of the case at
length. 123
Justice Levy began his concurrence by tracing the evolution of the "em-
ployment-at-will" doctrine, noting numerous out-dated reasons for its exist-
ence. 124 Justice Levy then discussed article 5221k of the TCHRA as a
legislatively created exception to the at-will doctrine. 125 The concurrence
turned next to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arline,126 not-
ing the Court's approval of protection for individuals who are physically
able to function on the job, but who are perceived as handicapped and find it
difficult to continue to work as a result of negative co-worker reaction. 127
Justice Levy stressed the necessity of conducting a fair inquiry in order best
to serve the employee's interest in showing that he or she does not have the
disease or that the risk of infection is slight, as well as the public's interest in
freedom from contagion.128
Justice Levy criticized the majority's deliberate refusal to provide Little
121. Id. at 939. District Judge Eugene Chambers dismissed the suit before trial, stating
that Little failed to show malice on the part of the employer. Id. at 938. On appeal, Little
argued that the employer failed to prove its entitlement to the protection of a qualified privi-
lege. Id. The court of appeals sustained this point of error. Id.
122. 733 S.W.2d at 938. Justice Bass, in commenting on Justice Levy's concurring opinion,
discouraged such expression of personal viewpoints on issues of special interest that the major-
ity did not consider. Id. at 939. Justice Bass stated that a discussion of those issues should
evolve only after presentation of the evidence in a trial on the merits. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 939-41. At one point, Justice Levy contrasted the antiquated at-will doctrine
with modern notions of fairness and decency. Justice Levy restated the relevant facts of the
case: Little's three-year outstanding personnel record, the employer's failure to observe nor-
mal termination procedures, the realization that neither Little nor his roommate were actually
afflicted with AIDS, and the employer's failure to make even a minimal effort to investigate or
verify Little's purported illness. Id. at 941.
125. Id.
126. 107 S. Ct. at 1123, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 315. For a discussion of Arline see supra notes 56-
66 and accompanying text.
127. Little, 733 S.W.2d at 941-42.
128. Id. at 942.
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with guidance on his cause of action. 1 29 This approach, Justice Levy be-
lieved, directly conflicted with notions of judicial economy.130 Justice Levy
expressed his desire that the majority address Little's substantive challenges,
rather than reversing on a procedural matter and thus perhaps requiring the
court to face the same issues on appeal in the future.1 3 1 Justice Levy noted
that AIDS discrimination is an intense, continuing, and expanding matter of
public concern.132 Together, Justice Levy's concurrence and the Arline deci-
sion should give an employee perceived as afflicted with AIDS some assur-
ance that he or she will receive protection against unlawful discrimination
under the TCHRA.133
III. EMPLOYEE AND APPLICANT TESTING
In response to the AIDS crisis in the workplace, many employers are
fighting back by screening applicants as well as current employees for the
presence of the AIDS virus. 134 The legal implications of requiring AIDS
testing as a condition of future and continuous employment are of considera-
ble importance to employers and their attorneys. Some significant questions
that employers commonly ask are whether they can test applicants and em-
ployees for AIDS, whether they can refuse to hire an applicant based on the
test result if the applicant tested positive, and whether an employer can ter-
minate an employee based on a positive AIDS test result. 135
129. Id. at 947.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 944.
132. Id. at 947.
133. Employees must nevertheless give proper attention to employer defenses that may
justify otherwise unreasonable discrimination against AIDS victims. Section 5.07 of the
TCHRA provides an enumeration of certain employment practices that are not considered
unlawful. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.07 (Vernon 1987). Section 5.07(a)(3)
indicates that an employer may employ varying standards of compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment under some form of legitimate employee benefit plan, so long as
the plan is not merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. Section 5.07(a)(7) allows an employer
to engage in discrimination provided the employer can prove that such practice is not intended
to contravene directly the prohibitions of the TCHRA and is justified by a business necessity.
Id.; see Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (busi-
ness necessity justifies telephone company's requirement that service technicians be able to
climb telephone poles). In addition, Elstner holds that an employer may rebut a claimant's
prima facie case by coming forward with evidence that the employer did not discriminate
against the employee "because of handicap" or "on the basis of handicap." Id. at 1345.
134. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 41-42.
135. R. Gaswirth, AIDS-An Update for Employers 19-21 (Sept. 22, 1986) (on file with
the Southwestern Law Journal). Related questions not covered herein include: what steps
should an employer take if employees refuse to work with an employee who tested positive for
AIDS? Does an employer have a duty to warn other employees if one employee tested positive
for AIDS? If an employer hires an applicant despite a positive test result, can the employer be
sued for negligent hiring? Interview with Ron Gaswirth, Attorney with Gardere & Wynne,
Dallas, Texas (Nov. 1987). On Sept. 2, 1986, a Chicago woman filed a $12 million dollar suit
for negligent hiring against American Airlines after a ticket agent who subsequently tested
positive for the AIDS virus bit her while she attempted to board a flight. At the time, the
airlines did not employ any method of medically screening employees, instead handling the
problems on a case-by-case basis. Employer Liability, Passenger Sues American Airlines Over
Bite, AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 17, at 2 (Sept. 10, 1986). For a discussion of prohibited and
permissible employer actions, see Zellner, supra note 35, at 6-7, 9-10.
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A. Methods of Testing
Currently, no single test exists for determining whether or not a person
has AIDS.1 3 6 Diagnostic tests initially licensed by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration for screening blood donations may, however, help in diag-
nosing AIDS.137 The tests most commonly used, the HIV138 and ELISA
1 39
tests, detect the presence of the AIDS virus based on a finding of related
antibodies. 140 These tests merely indicate the presence of antibodies, and not
the existence of the underlying disease that the virus causes. 14 1 These tests
are not tests for AIDS and have no prognostic value.1 4
2
The accuracy of either the HIV or ELISA test is questionable. 143 Since
the test merely indicates the presence of antibodies, false negative results
tend to occur. 144 This may result when exposure to the virus is so recent
that the virus is still in the incubation period, so that the body has yet to
form the antibodies.1 45 False positive results may also occur for a variety of
reasons; for example, other blood substances may lead to a positive test re-
sult. 14 6 In addition, a false positive may result when an individual who suc-
cessfully defeated the virus still retains traces of the antibodies in his or her
blood. 147
In the case of an accurate positive result, it is important to remember that
the test merely documents exposure to AIDS, and does not conclusively in-
dicate that the individual will actually develop AIDS. 148 Due to the inaccu-
racy of the test, critics recommend implementing two ELISA tests.
1 49
Supplementary tests such as the Western Blot or the IFA (immu-
nofluorescence assay) should follow two positive results on the ELISA
136. Mass, supra note 3, at 69.
137. Leonard, supra note 12, at 41.
138. Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus-Type III.
139. Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay.
140. Sicklick & Rubinstein, supra note 21, at 9.
141. Id.
142. Id. See also Leonard, supra note 12, at 42; Mass, supra note 3, at 70. The test is most
useful in detecting those people who are able to spread the disease. Reidinger, A Question of
Balance, Policing the AIDS Epidemic, 73 A.B.A. J. 69, 72 (1987).
143. Leonard, supra note 12, at 41.
144. Sicklick & Rubinstein, supra note 21, at 9; Leonard supra note 12, at 41; G. Portela,
supra note 22, at 40. A false negative result may occur when exposure to the AIDS virus is so
recent that the test does not indicate the presence of the virus because the antibodies have not
yet formed in the bloodstream. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 40.
145. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
146. Leonard, supra note 12, at 41; G. Portela, supra note 22, at 40-41.
147. Leonard, supra note 12, at 41; G. Portela, supra note 22, at 41. The U.S. Food and
Drug Administration found that the number of false positive results increase as testing within
low-risk groups such as the general employee population increases. G. Portela, supra note 22,
at 41.
148. Stein, AIDS-An Employer's Dilemma, 7 FLA. B.J. 55, 55 (1986). The American
Medical Association, however, recently indicated that it is probable that 100% of those in-
fected with the AIDS virus will eventually develop AIDS. Special Report, AMA Forum Told
That HIV May Always Lead to AIDS, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 8, at 6 (May 6, 1987).





The United States Armed Forces currently tests more than three million
employees for the AIDS virus and the Department of State tests its Foreign
Service employees. 15' Certain factors, not applicable in other employment
contexts, justify mandatory AIDS testing in the Armed Services. First, the
military often administers vaccines containing live virus to personnel in the
event that the military will assign them to a country where the risk of con-
tracting that particular disease is high. 5 2 In order to prevent inoculating a
live virus into a person whose immune system is defenseless, the military
uses mandatory AIDS tests.' 53 Secondly, due to the need for emergency
blood transfusions on the battlefield, mandatory AIDS tests are warranted to
ensure a safe blood supply during wartime.15 4
In contrast to a public employer such as the Armed Forces, private em-
ployers are not able to justify mandatory testing on the same grounds.
Moreover, the Food and Drug Administration's licensing restrictions on the
AIDS test and the passage of stringent confidentiality and antidiscrimination
laws may make it difficult for an employer lawfully to require such testing or
to examine the test results without permission of the employee.' 55 Some
companies engaged in the food preparation business attempt to justify
mandatory AIDS testing on the grounds that the AIDS test is merely one of
several tests given to all applicants in order to expose the presence of conta-
gious diseases. 156 Some companies extend this rationale to include the posi-
tion that a positive result from any of the tests administered will not
necessarily result in termination, but rather may result in a different task or
job assignment. 15 7
Opposition to mandatory AIDS-screening is widespread. The United
States Department of Health and Human Services guidelines on AIDS in the
workplace stressed that AIDS is not transmitted by casual contact, and for
this reason, did not recommend routine AIDS tests. 158 One of the Surgeon
General's Reports on AIDS advised that mandatory AIDS testing is not
necessary, pointing out the possibility of unmanageable procedures, cost
prohibitions, and the false sense of security that a false negative result pro-
duces.159 More recently, officials at the Department of Health and Human
150. Gostin & Curran, AIDS Screening Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 77 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 361, 361 (1987).
151. Reidinger, supra note 142, at 72. The American Federation of Government Employ-
ees recently filed suit to end these testing programs. Id.
152. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 42.
153. Id.
154. Id.; Reidinger, supra note 142, at 72.
155. Leonard, supra note 12, at 42.
156. G. Portela, supra note 22, at 43.
157. Id.
158. Recommendations, supra note 6, at 681.
159. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 7, at 33. The Surgeon General also encouraged vol-
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Services reemphasized their opposition to screening employees for AIDS.' 60
New Public Health Service guidelines favor prohibition of compulsive test-
ing in most instances, and indicate that stringent confidentiality and antidis-
crimination assurances are vital to the encouragement of voluntary
testing. 161
Absent a specific statute concerning AIDS testing, employers and their
attorneys may seek guidance from the relevant state handicap discrimination
statute. If AIDS is considered a handicap within the meaning of the state
discrimination statute, an employer will not be allowed to discriminate based
on the test results. 162 An employer will find it extremely difficult to justify
adverse employment action against an employee who is capable of perform-
ing his or her job, absent a reasonable likelihood of harm to the employee or
co-workers. 163 Requiring an AIDS test as a condition of employment may
prove to be conclusive evidence of an employer's discriminatory behavior
against AIDS victims. 164 This is especially true in instances where a non-
medical employer has no legitimate need to know whether a person has
AIDS. 165
C. Statutory Authority in Texas
Effective September 1, 1987, the Texas Legislature amended the Commu-
nicable Disease Prevention and Control Act (the Act), 166 implementing arti-
cle 9 entitled "Tests for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and
Related Disorders."1 67 Sponsors of the bill that became law believe that arti-
cle 9 is a balanced approach towards AIDS-related issues. 168 Since Texas is
ranked fourth among those states with the largest number of confirmed cases
of AIDS, sponsors of the bill believed Texas needed to confront the problem
directly. 169 The desired effect of article 9 is to encourage society to treat
AIDS as strictly a public health concern and to disregard any preconceived
stigma or bias. 170 Planning for this bill began approximately six to nine
months prior to the meeting of the legislature. 171 Most of the ideas for draft-
ing the bill came from policy statements of the Texas Department of
untary testing by those in a high-risk group. Id.; see also UNDERSTANDING AIDS, supra note
4, at 5.
160. Employment, HHS Officials Reemphasize Opposition to Screening, I AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 8, at 6 (May 7, 1986).
161. Antibody Testing, Voluntary Tests Endorsed by Public Health Service, 2 AIDS Pol'y &
L. (BNA) No. 16, at 7 (Aug. 26, 1987).
162. Stein, supra note 148, at 56.
163. Id.
164. Stein, supra note 148, at 57.
165. Id. In nonmedical employment situations the United States Department of Public
Health does not recommend mandatory AIDS testing because casual contact does not trans-
mit AIDS. Id. at 59 n.27.
166. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
167. Id. art. 4419b-1, §§ 9.01-.06.
168. Telephone interview with Leslie Friedlander, Administrative Assistant to Rep. Nancy






Health's Task Force and the federal CDC in Atlanta. 172
The bill, approved June 17, 1987, essentially prohibits mandatory AIDS
testing subject to specific limited exceptions.173 Section 9.01 of the Act con-
tains definitions for AIDS, HIV, bona fide occupational qualifications, blood
bank, and test result. 174 Section 9.02, entitled Tests for AIDS and Related
Disorders, contains the specific prohibition against mandatory testing and
related exceptions. 75 Section 9.03 concerns the confidentiality and disclo-
sure of test results.176 Section 9.04 provides an action for civil liability and
appropriate remedies for any person injured by a violation of sections 9.02 or
9.03.177 Sections 9.05 and 9.06 specify the penalty for a violation of section
9.02 and 9.03 respectively. 17 8
Section 9.02(a) prohibits any "person or entity" from requiring any other
person to submit to any type of an AIDS-related test. 179 Section 9.02(c)
provides a narrow exception to the general prohibition found in section
9.02(a), permitting AIDS testing in the event of a sudden and imminent dan-
ger to public health and welfare based on sound findings of medical and
scientific fact.' 80 Emergency rules adopted under section 9.02(c) must meet
four additional requirements. ' 8
Section 9.02(a)(1) through (5) contain additional exceptions permitting
AIDS testing.' 82 Section 9.02(a)(1) permits testing as a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification where no less discriminatory means exist to satisfy the
qualification.' 8 3 Section 9.02(a)(2) allows AIDS testing to screen blood, re-
172. Id. These are only a few of the policy statements concerning AIDS that the drafters
of the bill used. Id.
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, §§ 9.01-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988). The
Texas Board of Insurance informed the legislature that insurers were not one of the classes
excepted from the prohibition on AIDS testing. Insurance Discrimination, Texas Adopts
Emergency Rule Permitting Limited Testing, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 17, at 1 (Sept. 9,
1987). The board warned that without such an exception, life, health, and accident insurance
companies would be forced to cease business activities in Texas. Id. As a result, the board
adopted an emergency rule permitting insurers to test applicants for exposure to the AIDS
virus as long as the insurer conducts testing without discrimination for all applicants in the
same actuarial class. Id. at 8, col. 2.
174. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
175. See id. § 9.02.
176. See id. § 9.03.
177. See id. § 9.04.
178. See id. §§ 9.05-.06.
179. See id. § 9.02(a).
180. See id. § 9.02(c).
181. Id. Emergency rules adopted under § 9.02(c) must:
(1) provide for the narrowest application of HIV testing necessary for the
protection of public health;
(2) provide procedures and guidelines to be followed by affected entities and
state agencies that clearly specify the need and justification for the testing, spec-
ify methods to be used to assure confidentiality, and delineate responsibility and
authority for carrying out the recommended actions;
(3) provide for counseling of persons with seropositive test results; and
(4) provide for confidentiality regarding persons tested and their test results.
Id.
182. See id. § 9.02(a)(l)-(5).
183. See id. § 9.02(a)(1). Section 9.02(b) places the burden upon the employer to prove that
the test is necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification. See id. § 9.02(b).
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lated products, organs, or tissues for donative protection. 184  Section
9.02(a)(3) permits AIDS testing if necessary with respect to a person covered
under the Act.'8 5 Section 9.02(a)(4) provides for permissible AIDS testing
of residents and clients of residential facilities of the Texas Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation, subject to two additional require-
ments.18 6 Section 9.02(a)(5) allows AIDS testing if necessary to manage ac-
cidental exposure to blood or other bodily fluids, subject to further
requirements.' 8 7 Section 9.02(g) provides an additional exception and per-
mits AIDS testing of a patient before undergoing a medical procedure that
might expose health care personnel to AIDS, provided adequate time to de-
duce the test result exists before the procedure.1 88
Section 9.03, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Test Results, prohibits the
release of test results except in certain limited situations.189 The person
tested may authorize the release of the test results by written consent.190
The written authorization must include the identity of the persons to whom
disclosure will be made.191
The Dallas County AIDS Planning Commission, after six months of prep-
aration, recently submitted its report entitled A Community Response to
AIDS to the Commissioners Court.1 92 The commission divided into seven
task forces, each addressing a specific area of concern. 193 The Legal/Ethical
Task Force addressed several topics, namely factors affecting the considera-
tion of testing issues. 194 Commenting on prospective testing found in section
9.02(g) of the Act, the Legal/Ethical Task Force pointed out that patients
184. See id. § 9.02(a)(2).
185. See id. § 9.02(a)(3). The drafters intent regarding this obscure exception is not clear.
This provision will probably not provide any useful guidance due to its impreciseness.
186. See id. § 9.02(a)(4). Such testing is permitted if
(A) the test result would change the medical or social management of the
person tested or others who associate with that person; and
(B) the test is conducted in accordance with guidelines that have been adopted
by the residential facility or the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, and approved by the department.
Id.
187. See id. § 9.02(a)(5).
188. See id. § 9.02(g).
189. See id. § 9.03.
190. See id. § 9.03(d).
191. Id.
192. DALLAS COUNTY AIDS PLANNING COMMISSION, A COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO
AIDS (1988).
193. Id. at v. The seven task forces consist of the Community Resources Task Force, the
Education Task Force, the Health Care Task Force, the Hospitals Task Force, the Insurance
Task Force, the Legal/Ethical Issues Task Force, and the Public Information Task Force. Id.
at vii.
194. Id. at 7-5. Some comments that the Legal/Ethical Task Force made with respect to
testing for antibodies for AIDS are: the testing must have an ethically acceptable purpose; the
means used to perform the test and the use of the test results must parallel the tests' purpose;
one must give notification that testing will be performed; counseling programs are needed to
interpret the test results; confidentiality is needed; AIDS testing is not always accurate; in-
creased testing may divert much needed funds from other AIDS programs; discovering in-
fected persons will not cease the spread of AIDS, therefore re-testing would be necessary to
identify those persons subsequently infected. Id.
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undergoing such procedures may be forced to submit to an AIDS test only if
there is ample time to receive the results prior to conducting the medical or
surgical procedure.1 95 Additionally, section 9.02(g) fails to define "patient"
or "health care personnel," and does not indicate the types of facilities to
which the provision applies. 196 The task force presumed that section 9.02(g)
applies to all institutions having health care personnel at risk where the test
results can be obtained prior to conducting the medical procedure.1 97
The Legal/Ethical Task Force then commented on retrospective testing
found in section 9.02(a)(5) of the Act.198 The task force noted that this sec-
tion is not limited to health care facilities, although the occurrence of acci-
dental exposure to blood is more likely at such a facility. 199 Section 9.02(d)
refers back to section 9.02(a)(5) and by its language assumes that subsection
(a)(5) is limited to health care agencies and facilities. 20° Section 9.02(d) re-
quires that mandatory testing comply with certain protocols adopted by the
agency or facility and these protocols must clearly establish procedural
guidelines for testing that respect the rights of those persons involved; the
section does not specify what these guidelines are or what rights of those
persons involved are supposed to be respected. 20 The task force noted
many unanswered issues such as: the failure of the section to specify the
types of settings to which section 9.02(a)(5) applies; the failure of section
9.02(d) to specify the types of health care agencies or facilities that are
within that section's scope; and the statute's silence regarding procedural
guidelines that would sufficiently protect the rights of AIDS-infected per-
sons.20 2 The task force assumed that section 9.02(a)(5) applies equally to
health care workers and patients who are exposed or infected. 20 3
The Legal/Ethical Task Force turned next to section 9.02(a)(2) of the
Act, which deals with compulsory testing in donative circumstances. 2°4 The
task force noted that section 9.02(a)(2) does not specify the type of entity
that may require such testing.205 The task force found it conceivable, there-
fore, that health care facilities, organ banks, and bloodbanks could all imple-
ment mandatory testing programs for donative purposes.20 6
The Legal/Ethical Task Force then addressed factors affecting testing in
employment. 207 The task force reiterated the applicability of section
9.02(a)(1) of the Act to situations where the test is necessary as a bona fide
195. Id. at 7-7.
196. Id. at 7-7 to -8.







204. Id. at 7-9.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The Legal/Ethical Task Force stated that § 9.02(a)(2) does not mention issues
such as informed consent and pre-test or post-test counseling. Id.
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occupational qualification and no less discriminatory means of satisfying this
qualification exists. 20 8 The task force noted that the Act does not mandate
that employers testing employees pursuant to section 9.02(a)(1) conduct pre-
or post-testing counseling, nor does the Act address the issue of informed
consent.
20 9
The Legal/Ethical Task Force then considered factors affecting premari-
tal testing. 2 10 Section 9.02(e) of the Act provides that when the rate of con-
firmed positive HIV infection reaches .83 percent, as reported under this
Act, the Texas Board of Health must implement emergency rules for com-
pulsory testing for HIV infection as a condition of receiving a marriage li-
cense.2 11 The task force noted that so far the prevalence rate of confirmed
positive HIV infection is well below the .83 percent threshold.
2 12
The Legal/Ethical Task Force then addressed factors affecting testing of
Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR)
residents and clients as found in section 9.02(a)(4) of the Act.213 The task
force merely pointed out that section 9.02(a)(4) authorizes testing of these
persons, but only if the test results would alter the medical or social manage-
ment of the person tested or those persons associating with that person, and
the tests are implemented in compliance with guidelines of the relevant facil-
ity or the TDMHMR and are approved by the Texas Department of
Health.2 14 The task force stated that regulations concerning section
9.02(a)(4) have yet to be published. 2 15
Lastly the Legal/Ethical Task Force examined section 9.02(c) dealing
with discretionary testing by the Texas Department of Health (TDH).2 16
Section 9.02(c) permits the Texas Board of Health to implement emergency
rules for compulsory HIV testing if the commissioner of the TDH files a
certificate of necessity with the board, supported by findings of medical and
scientific fact, and professing a sudden and imminent threat to public
health.21 7 While this provision has yet to be employed and no rules or regu-
lations have been drafted, the task force noted that if the board finds it neces-
sary to enact such rules, they must meet four additional requirements found
in section 9.02(c). 2 18
The Legal/Ethical Task Force then proceeded to discuss guidelines that
should be developed concerning mandatory and voluntary AIDS testing.
219
The discussion began by stressing that since there is no known cure for




211. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.02(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
212. DALLAS COUNTY AIDS PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 192, at 7-9.




217. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
218. DALLAS COUNTY AIDS PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 192, at 7-11.
219. Id. at 7-27.
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circulation of AIDS.220 Whether testing is voluntary or mandatory, the task
force recommended the test be implemented with an equal degree of care. 221
In addition, whether the testing is voluntary or mandatory, in most instances
the individual must be notified that testing will take place.222
The Legal/Ethical Task Force first recommended that certain enumerated
guidelines for testing be followed, constantly weighing the benefits of testing
to the individual, the testing agency, and society against the known and pos-
sible consequences in each situation.223 The second recommendation advo-
cated the goal of confidentiality. 224 The third recommendation called for the
monitoring of community testing facilities to ensure that low-cost testing is
available to those persons who are most likely to benefit from the testing. 225
The fourth recommendation urged periodic evaluation of testing regulations
and guidelines. 226 The final recommendation stressed that the task force
does not believe in large scale testing of low risk individuals, but suggested
that those persons in the high risk groups may benefit from voluntary testing
and should be encouraged to participate. 227
Additional AIDS-related legislation in Texas may be forthcoming. 228
During the week of October 26, 1987, Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby and
House Speaker Gib Lewis formed the state's first legislative task force on
AIDS.229 The seventeen-member panel consists of six legislators and eleven
representatives of various professions such as the medical, social service, ed-
ucation, religion, and insurance professions. 230 Hobby and Lewis jointly ap-




223. Id. at 7-27 to -28. The task force listed five guidelines for testing. Id.
224. Id. at 7-28.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. In the executive summary to the report of the Legal/Ethical Task Force, the
members warned that all recommendations made are limited by the amount of information
available at the time and by the preciseness of projections made based upon this information.
Id. at 7-2. The task force suggested modification of the recommendations as new information
is received and new possibilities develop. Id.
228. The Dallas County AIDS Planning Commission's 260-page report presented to the
Dallas County Commissioners Court on June 30, 1988, proposed improvements in health care
services for the county's AIDS victims, requested additional funding for those services, and
proposed antidiscrimination laws that would provide protection for the victims. Dallas Morn-
ing News, July 1, 1988, at IA, col. 3. The highlight of the commission's report consisted of a
recommendation that the county establish a Dallas County Board of Health to address public
health needs such as the AIDS crisis, infant mortality, teen pregnancy, and environmental
health problems. Id. While Dallas County officials estimated they would take only one month
to review the report, concerned citizens fear that the report will be set aside and forgotten.
Dallas Morning News, July, 1, 1988, at 21A, col. 1. Prior attempts to establish a countywide
health board failed due to political disagreement between the county's 26 municipalities. Id.,
July 1, 1988, at 24A, col. 1. The health board, if established, would advise Dallas County,
various other municipalities, and Parkland Memorial Hospital, on health-care issues. Id.
229. Dallas Morning News, Nov. 7, 1987, at IA, col. 1.
230. Id., Nov. 7, 1987, at 14A, col. 1.
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of this committee. 23 1 The members of the Texas Joint Committee commit-
ted themselves to studying the AIDS problem for two years until the legisla-
ture's next meeting in January of 1989, at which time the committee will
present a report to the legislature.232 Cost issues associated with AIDS will
be of primary importance to the committee.233 The committee will also con-
duct an inquiry into various services that are needed to help alleviate the
AIDS problem. 234
IV. CONCLUSION
As the previous discussion recognizes, it is likely that AIDS will be con-
sidered a handicap under federal as well as Texas laws. Employers, there-
fore, are advised not to discriminate against employees with AIDS,
employees who tested positive for the AIDS virus, or employees who are
perceived as having AIDS, unless there is a real and substantial interference
with the employee's ability to perform the essential tasks of his job. It would
be wise for the employer to attempt to accommodate the employee if at all
possible by assigning the employee to a different task.
While there is no guarantee against employer liability, the implementation
of an AIDS response plan on the site may help decrease the risk of employer
liability.235 Such a plan can educate other employees as well as the public
concerning AIDS and can help dispel rumors among co-workers concerning
the transmission of AIDS. Attorneys should advise employers to institute a
formal AIDS policy well in advance of discovery of an employee with AIDS.
An attorney drafting a company policy on AIDS should take into account
the particular needs of that business.
AIDS testing of individuals involves numerous ethical, practical, and legal
issues. In the workplace employers need to be advised of the current state of
the law concerning mandatory testing and what would be considered a bona
fide occupational qualification. In Texas, the Texas Communicable Disease
Prevention and Control Act provides employers with certain guidelines for
testing employees. The Legal/Ethical Task Force of the Dallas County
AIDS Planning Commission recommends that testing be conducted under
the supervision of a licensed physician with the assistance of an accredited
laboratory; that positive test results be confirmed by a second AIDS test; and
231. Telephone interview with Leslie Friedlander, Administrative Assistant to Rep. Nancy
McDonald (Nov. 2, 1987).
232. Dallas Morning News, supra note 229, at IA. The committee would like to estimate
the cost of caring for AIDS patients. Id.
233. Telephone interview with Leslie Friedlander, Administrative Assistant to Rep. Nancy
McDonald (Nov. 2, 1987). The committee will attempt to define the state's role as AIDS
places an ever-increasing burden on the state's health care system. Dallas Morning News,
supra note 229, at IA.
234. Dallas Morning News, supra note 229, at IA.
235. The Legal/Ethical Task Force of the Dallas County AIDS Planning Commission be-
lieves the best employer response to the problem of AIDS in the workplace is the educa-




that post-test counseling be provided.236
The number of reported cases of AIDS increases daily. AIDS in the
workplace forces employers to confront moral issues surrounding AIDS as
well as constantly changing legal issues concerning AIDS. Employers can-
not be expected to keep abreast of the current state of the law in the AIDS
area by themselves. The AIDS crisis in the workplace has created a new
legal specialty-the AIDS lawyer. The constant flow of legal questions from
concerned employers mandates that the attorney involved become proficient
in this area of the law. Until medical knowledge and legal precedent con-
cerning AIDS becomes firmly established and well founded, the legal di-
lemma of AIDS in the workplace will continue.
236. Id. at 7-2 to -3.
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